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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MRS THATCHER'S MONETARISM 
BY DR J FOSTER, DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW 
1 . INTRODUCTION 
During t h e p a s t few weeks we have w i t n e s s e d a n o t h e r round of d e f l a t i o n a r y 
p o l i c y in t h e UK. Even a t h r e e m i l l i o n unemployment f i g u r e d id not s t o p 
the Government from r a i s i n g i n t e r e s t r a t e s s i g n i f i c a n t l y . The p r e t e x t for 
t h i s s e v e r e mone ta ry a c t i o n was t h a t i n c r e a s e d bank l e n d i n g t h r e a t e n e d t o 
r a i s e mone ta ry g rowth and cause i n f l a t i o n . On t h e face of i t , t h i s i s a 
m o n e t a r i s t j u s t i f i c a t i o n . However, a cursory glance a t r ecen t mone ta r i s t 
thought y i e l d s the view t h a t i n t e r e s t r a t e s should be f ree ly determined in 
f i n a n c i a l m a r k e t s and t h a t t h e G o v e r n m e n t s h o u l d u s e o t h e r p o l i c y 
in s t rumen t s to c o n t r o l the money supply. 
The r e a l reason for r a i s i n g i n t e r e s t r a t e s i s q u i t e non-mone ta r i s t . S t e r l i n g 
had to be defended a g a i n s t a s t rong d o l l a r , backed by very high US i n t e r e s t 
r a t e s , b e c a u s e of f e a r s in t h e Ci ty t h a t d e v a l u a t i o n would cause c o s t 
i n f l a t i o n . The s h o r t - t e r m ' g u t r e a c t i o n s ' of t h e Ci ty were p r e f e r r e d t o 
the longe r - t e rm p r e d i c t i o n s of mone ta r i s t theory . Geoffrey Howe was quick 
to blame t h e Uni ted S t a t e s for t he i n c r e a s e s , but he had a much g r e a t e r 
degree of d i s c r e t i o n than he unp l i ed , as any examination of the r e a c t i o n s of 
other c o u n t r i e s demonstra tes . - ' 
I t i s no l o n g e r even c l e a r t h a t r a i s i n g i n t e r e s t r a t e s in t h e d e p t h s of a 
r eces s ion w i l l succeed in curbing monetary growth. The lesson of 1980 was 
t h a t higher i n t e r e s t r a t e s tended to i nc rease ' d i s t r e s s borrowing' as f i r m s , 
which were a l r e a d y f i n a n c i n g t h e i r l i q u i d i t y p o s i t i o n on a s u b s t a n t i a l 
o v e r d r a f t , had t o i n c r e a s e t h e i r b o r r o w i n g t o pay the e x t r a i n t e r e s t . 
Fur thermore , in the case of very l a r g e f i r m s , the ex t r a i n t e r e s t i s regarded 
as a r i s i n g c o s t and may even c o n t r i b u t e to c o s t i n f l a t i o n . I t i s t h e 
small bus iness wi th l i m i t e d c r e d i t l i n e s and facing market compet i t ion t h a t 
i s h a r d e s t h i t . P a r a d o x i c a l l y , t h i s i s t he k ind of b u s i n e s s t h a t t h e 
p resen t Government looks to for fu tu re economic growth in B r i t a i n ! 
The Government a s s e r t s i t s b e l i e f in a mone ta r i s t theory of i n f l a t i o n then 
d e s i g n s p o l i c i e s t o f i g h t c o s t i n f l a t i o n . I t p l a c e s i t s f a i t h in t he 
p o t e n t i a l of s m a l l b u s i n e s s t hen t h a t p o t e n t i a l . In t h e end, i t i s no t 
higher i n t e r e s t r a t e s t h a t have lowered bus iness conf idence, but the growing 
r e a l i s a t i o n t h a t t h e Government canno t be t r u s t e d t o p r a c t i c e what i t 
p r e a c h e s . One of t h e o r i g i n a l a t t r a c t i o n s of t h e T h a t c h e r Government t o 
bus iness was the promise of s t r o n g , c o n s i s t e n t p o l i c i e s in c o n t r a s t t o the 
doub le - t a lk pragmatism of the previous Labour Government. However, j u s t as 
the Trade Unions came to r e a l i s e t h a t Labour's l i p - s e r v i c e to soc ia l i sm did 
not match i t s p o l i t i c a l c o m p r o m i s e s , so bus ines smen have begun t o t i r e of 
the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s i nhe ren t in the presen t Government's policymaking. 
The c u r r e n t l y f a s h i o n a b l e ' r a t i o n a l e x p e c t a t i o n s ' t h e o r y he ld by some 
m o n e t a r i s t s e m p h a s i s e s t h e view t h a t economic a g e n t s pay a t t e n t i o n t o 
economic pol icy in forming t h e i r expec t a t i ons and making d e c i s i o n s . I t 
i s a l s o very p l a u s i b l e to a rgue t h a t t h e same a g e n t s w i l l r e a c t t o t h e 
i n c r e a s e d u n c e r t a i n t y t h a t accompan ies c o n t r a d i c t o r y p o l i c y m a k i n g . In 
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particular, they are likely to take fewer investment risks. The poor 
record of manufacturing investment in the UK over the past 15 years, in 
contrast to other countries such as Japan where there has been a much 
greater degree of consistency in government policy, may well be associated 
with this recurring problem.* 
The purpose of this paper is to focus on the contradictions in policymaking 
that have been observed over time in the actions of successive Governments. 
Attention is on the present Government simply because its contradictions are 
of immediate and urgent concern. A similar historical exercise could be 
conducted on the last Labour Government with similar conclusions, but from a 
different political standpoint. The spirit of the paper is that the extent 
to which a government remains consistent in its policymaking may be as 
important as the policies themselves. Furthermore, the longer Governments 
sacrifice consistency for short-term political expediency the more likely it 
is that support will be forthcoming for totalitarianism of the far right or 
the far left.6 
The structure of the paper is as follows. First, several of the 
contradictions in present government policy are isolated. Second, a 
detailed discussion of the policy contradiction that exists in the area of 
government subsidies to persons is presented. Third, the reasons why 
contradictions develop between the theory of economic policy, and political 
decisions are discussed. Fourth, some suggestions are offered on ways in 
which the links between economics and politics could be changed. 
THE MONETARIST EXPERIMENT 
The image that the Thatcher Cabinet has attempted to project is one of 
unbending determination to pursue policies which are firmly founded on 
monetarist/libertarian doctrine. Protests concerning the effects of these 
policies, even from within the Conservative party, have been ignored 
irrespective of their logical basis. The Governmnent's view of these 
protests is political; as are complaints made by patients who have to take 
unpleasant medicine. Appeals that policies are too crude and simple to 
cope with the complex feedback mechanisms in the real economy are regarded 
as obfuscation. The passage of time will overcome all these transient 
complexities and the policies will be effective. If not, monetarism will 
have failed, not the Government. 
However, is it accurate to state that we have been experiencing a genuine 
•monetarist experiment'? In setting up and running any scientific 
experiment at least three preconditions are essential: 
The initial conditions or starting assumptions, under 
which the theory or hypothesis is supposed to work, 
should exist or be operationalised. 
The pattern of actual causal impulses should be as close 
as possible to its theoretical counterpart. In 
particular theoretical and operational consistency 
between different impulses should be maintained. 
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i i i . In the course of the exper iment , the p a t t e r n of impulses . 
shou ld remain unchanged , o t h e r w i s e t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e 
r e s u l t s w i l l be l o s t . 
Experiments in economics are no to r ious ly d i f f i c u l t to conduct because of the 
absence of l a b o r a t o r y c o n d i t i o n s . However, in the case of the ' m o n e t a r i s t 
exper iment ' we would expect to observe some minimal adherence to the above 
p r e c o n d i t i o n s : 
i . The t r a n s m i s s i o n mechanism between money supply and 
i n f l a t i o n should be c l e a r l y understood and o p e r a t i o n a l 
d e f i n i t i o n s of the money supply and o the r key v a r i a b l e s 
should be s e l e c t e d accord ing ly . 
i i . Moneta r i sm and a g e n e r a l b e l i e f in f r e e m a r k e t s a r e 
i n s e p a r a b l e . In a wor ld where m a r k e t s a r e b e l i e v e d to 
have become highly imper fec t , p a r t i c u l a r l y in the s h o r t -
r u n , any t e s t of m o n e t a r i s m shou ld i n c l u d e an e x t e n s i v e 
package of complimentary p o l i c i e s designed t o l i b e r a l i s e 
m a r k e t s . I f t h i s i s not done , mone ta ry p o l i c y i s 
i n a p p r o p r i a t e to t h e marke t s t r u c t u r e to which i t i s 
app l ied un le s s the policymaker f a l l s back on the un tes ted 
a s s e r t i o n t h a t in the long-run market fo rces w i l l f i n a l l y 
o p e r a t e . Most m o n e t a r i s t / l i b e r t a r i a n t h i n k e r s advocate 
t he p a r a l l e l i n t r o d u c t i o n of p o l i c i e s t o b reak up t h e 
power of monopo l i s t i c f i rms and t r a d e un ions , to reduce 
t h e amount of marke t i n t e r v e n t i o n by governmen t , t o 
reduce the s i z e of the i n e f f i c i e n t government bureaucracy 
and t o r emov e n o n - m a r k e t s y s t e m s of p a t r o n a g e and 
p r i v i l e d g e in s o c i e t y . ' Even though such p o l i c i e s 
canno t be imp lemen ted q u i c k l y , t h e i r i m p l e m e n t a t i o n 
o f f e r s the advantage of c r e a t i n g a heightened expec ta t ion 
t h a t ma rke t s o l u t i o n s w i l l occur in t h e f u t u r e adding 
cons ide rab l e weight to b e l i e f in monetary c o n t r o l . 
i i i . The moneta ry and o t h e r p o l i c y r u l e s shou ld be s t r i c t l y 
adhered to so t h a t t h e a u t h o r i t i e s become t r u s t e d and 
i n d i v i d u a l r e s p o n s e s t o economic p o l i c y become s t a b l e 
over t ime . 
Having t r a n s l a t e d the p r econd i t i ons of s c i e n t i f i c experiments i n t o a form 
s u i t a b l e fo r a ' m o n e t a r i s t e x p e r i m e n t ' , l e t us examine t h e Government ' s 
record on each count : 
( i ) The Theoret ical Basis 
Monetarism tends to be a body of economic theory which i s preoccupied with 
the t endency of t he economic sys tem to move to p o s i t i o n s of s t a t i c 
equ i l ib r ium or dynamic s teady s t a t e s . In g e n e r a l , the theory has l i t t l e to 
say a b o u t d i s e q u i l i b r i u m d y n a m i c s b e t w e e n d i f f e r e n t e q u i l i b r i a . 
Consequently, the t r a n s m i s s i o n mechanism between money supply and i n f l a t i o n 
i s o f t e n o b s c u r e and m o n e t a r i s t s a r e u s u a l l y f o r c e d t o r e l y on some very 
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speculative statistical analysis of time-lags to support their view on 
direction of causation and length of time before monetary control is 
completely effective. 
Recurring disputes rage between monetarists about time-lags, which range 
from under 1 year to 5 years in the existing literature on the subject. It 
is remarkable how the monetarist theory has become an article of faith on 
such a scant and unreliable theoretical and empirical base.' In addition, 
there has been much dispute over the choice of an appropriate definition of 
the money supply to control. It is ironical that Friedman has always been 
one of the strongest proponents of the view that a theory which cannot 
its variables is not a very useful theory. ° operationalise 
It would appear that the first precondition of the 'monetarist experiment' 
has not been met. The mechanism through which the policy is supposed to 
operate is unclear. The implications of the existence of a real world 
economic system which differs from the theoretical system have been ignored. 
The starting assumptions have not been operationalised. 
(ii) Implementation Consistency 
The Government has paid a great deal of lipservice to the ideals of 
libertarian thought necessarily bound up with monetarism but have backed it 
with little concrete action. In many cases the Government's pursuance of 
only one part of monetarist policy has led to repercussions which have 
militated against libertarian ideals. 
For example, to what extent has the Government taken action to break up 
monopolistic firms and trade unions and promote the interest of the small 
business sector? Despite some window-dressing aid to the latter sector, 
the reverse has occurred. Recessionary policy has hit smaller businesses 
much harder than larger businesses. VAT increases caused more difficulties 
for the former than the latter. Deregulation of prices in the name of 
competition has had the effect of pushing many small firms out of business, 
increasing monopolistic concentration. It is argued that this increases 
efficiency but this is frequently at the expense of the qualitative 
diversity offered by a large number of small firms. Such effects could 
have been offset by a parallel policy of breaking up the resultant 
monopolistic structures but such a policy has been completely lacking. 
Similar inaction has taken place in the area of industrial relations. The 
pretence that the economy is competitive "in the long-run" is carried over 
to the labour market in the monetarist slogan that "trade unions do not 
cause inflation". This neatly avoids the grave political difficulties 
inherent in any attempt to reform industrial relations without also tackling 
the problem of monopolistic firms. The Government's stance that free-
collective bargaining should thus prevail is contradicted by the imposition 
of public sector pay norms. 
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To what e x t e n t has t h e Government reduced i n t e r f e r e n c e in t h e economy and 
cut government bureacracy? The government preaches non - in t e r f e r ence then 
i n t e r f e r e s . In t h e d a y s of K e y n e s i a n p o l i c y t h e i n t e r v e n t i o n was 
e x p a n s i o n a r y t o o f f s e t i n f l a t i o n a r y t e n d e n c i e s , now t h e i n t e r v e n t i o n i s 
c o n t r a c t i o n a r y to o f f s e t i n f l a t i o n a r y t endenc ie s . Monetar is t ' n e u t r a l i t y ' 
maxims are not adhered t o . The main v e h i c l e for con t r ac t i ona ry pol icy has 
been cu t s in the publ ic s e c t o r . However, these cu t s have taken p l ace , not 
wi th waste and i n e f f i c i e n c y in mind, but in terms of achieving a sho r t - t e rm 
PSBR t a r g e t in t h e most p o l i t i c a l l y c o n v e n i e n t way. I n s t e a d of c u t t i n g 
i n t o the b u r e a u c r a t i c s o f t - c e n t r e , e s s e n t i a l pub l i c s e r v i c e s have been cut 
on the pe r iphe ry . In the n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s , investment i s cut much 
more than c o n s u m p t i o n , g u a r a n t e e i n g a slow d e a t h from o b s o l e s c e n c e and 
i n c r e a s e d i n e f f i c i e n c y . At the same t i m e , these i n d u s t r i e s a re forced to 
make a p r o f i t , which i s f r equen t ly achieved by i n t e n s i f i e d monopoly p r i c i n g , 
r e s u l t i n g in t h e u n d e r u t i l i s a t i o n of a d e p r e c i a t i n g c a p i t a l s t o c k . The 
pub l i c pay more for a poorer s e r v i c e . 
In sum, t h e r e i s l i t t l e e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e Government has succeeded in 
implementing the l i b e r t a r i a n dimension of mone ta r i s t po l i cy . The a c t i o n s 
taken r e f l e c t s h o r t - t e r m p o l i t i c a l expediency designed to make the economies 
n e c e s s a r y t o r e a c h a mone ta ry t a r g e t r a t h e r than measures t o improve 
resource a l l o c a t i o n and e f f i c i e n c y . I t may be the case t h a t , in f a c t , the 
Government neve r had any s e r i o u s l i b e r t a r i a n p l a n s and t h a t t h e i r a c t i o n s 
can be i n t e r p r e t e d as much more p o l i t i c a l than economic. The Government's 
a t t i t u d e to the l a s t t enen t of l i b e r t a r i a n monetarism, concerning p r i v i l e g e 
and pa t ronage , i s r evea l i ng in t h i s regard and w i l l be d iscussed in s ec t i on 
3 . 
( i i i ) Pol icy Invariance 
To what ex ten t has the Government adhered to i t s pol icy? I t i s here t h a t 
t he Government has f a l l e n down most d r a m a t i c a l l y in i t s ' m o n e t a r i s t 
e x p e r i m e n t ' . The c e n t r e - p i e c e of i t s s t r a t e g y - monetary c o n t r o l - has 
been in a cons t an t s t a t e of f lux . Techniques have been changed as t a r g e t s 
have not been met and o the r po l icy in s t rumen t s have been added to deal with 
s i t u a t i o n s beyond m o n e t a r i s t t h i n k i n g . P u b l i c s e c t o r pay norms and 
i n t e r e s t r a t e p o l i c y have a l r e a d y been ment ioned in t h i s r e g a r d . The 
Government has r epea t ed ly acted in c o n t r a d i c t i o n to the advice of Friedman 
and other m o n e t a r i s t s . •*• 
These c e n t r a l a l t e r a t i o n s of government p o l i c y , added to the pol icy i nac t i on 
in o t h e r a r e a s , g u a r a n t e e s t h a t we canno t say t h a t t h e e f f e c t s we o b s e r v e 
t e l l us anything about monetarism. Ins tead of a 'mone ta r i s t experiment ' we 
have a ' r u l e of t h u m b ' e x e r c i s e w h i c h i s c o n c e r n e d w i t h a p p l y i n g 
d e f l a t i o n a r y p o l i c y a t t h e f i r s t s i gn of r i s i n g i n f l a t i o n , for wha teve r 
reason, plus an o b j e c t i v e of ga in ing c o n t r o l of a monetary magnitude using 
whatever means a re a t the Government's d i s p o s a l . I t i s c e r t a i n l y the case 
t h a t the Government has done the m o n e t a r i s t / l i b e r t a r i a n case cons ide rab le 
damage in a s s o c i a t i n g i t w i t h r e c e s s i o n economics and monetary t a r g e t 
f a n a t i c i s m . ^ Many economists in t h i s school of thought are aware t h a t the 
marke t sys tem i s h i g h l y i m p e r f e c t and t h a t d e f l a t i o n a r y p o l i c y w i l l no t 
lower p r i c e s , bu t g e n e r a t e unemployment . Also they a r e aware t h a t t h e 
f o r c e s of c o m p e t i t i o n t end t o work p o o r l y when unemployment i s h igh and 
investment i s low but wel l when the economy i s growing. To them, monetary 
c o n t r o l i s no t a mean ing fu l p o l i c y by i t s e l f bu t only p a r t of a programme 
t h a t a t t e m p t s p r i m a r i l y t o i n c r e a s e t h e s c a l e of market c o m p e t i t i o n and 
allow growth to be generated in the p r i v a t e r a t h e r than the publ ic s e c t o r . 1 ^ 
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It is hard to recognise any elements of this view in the Government's 
present policy. Simple political dogma has superceded economic theory in 
policymaking. So let us move on to see whether there is any evidence to 
suggest that it was the Government's prior commitment to political interest 
groups that determined its policies rather than any real commitment to a 
'monetarist experiment'. 
3. THE POLITICS OF PRIVILEGE AHD PATRONAGE 
To what extent do the policies of the Government reflect an attempt to 
redistribute income, absolute and relative, from poorer to richer? Is its 
claim to be adhering to monetarist/libertarian theory merely an excuse for 
the introduction of redistributive devices? It would be going too far to 
argue that there was some simple socio-political conspiracy theory in 
operation - too many of the effects of the present Government's policies are 
affecting traditional Conservative supporters. However, there is plenty of 
evidence in the class divided political history of the UK that sectional 
interests have been reflected in economic policies. 
If we examine the Government's policies with regard to preferred treatment 
of one group at the expense of another, the discussion always comes round to 
the issue of support for the unemployed. In recent years this subsidy has 
been substantial as the Government has implemented policies which stimulate 
unemployment. There have been several attempts to reduce unemployment 
benefits and raise National Insurance Contributions. The justification for 
these measures is usually one concerning the size of the PSBR following the 
realisation that deflationary cuts in public expenditure are offset by a 
rise in public transfers to the unemployed. However, in addition to the 
discovery of this policy dilemma, there has been a longstanding Conservative 
policy to lower unemployment benefits. 
This policy is based on the view that unemployment benefits encourage people 
to choose leisure rather than work. A significant proportion of the 
unemployed are viewed as 'scroungers' on the rest of society. As for 
people who have become unemployed as a direct result of the Government's 
recessionary policy, it is felt that lower benefits will increase their 
incentive to accept low-paid employment when the economy turns up and firms 
require more labour. Thus, in theory, the measures have two libertarian 
objectives: firstly, to reduce society's handouts to the 'undeserving' and 
secondly, to increase incentive. 
The popular view that favourable benefits, particularly earnings related 
benefits (ERB), have led to subsidisation of leisure has been widely 
supported in sensationalistic newspaper articles which concentrate on 
isolated cases of serious abuse. The body of evidence on the matter 
offered by Britain's economists receives scant attention. 
A recent survey of this evidence by Atkinson (1981) concluded that the main 
impact of ERB was to extend the duration of unemployment spells by two to 
three weeks. When this is translated into numbers unemployed at a point in 
M9 
t ime i t becomes a very smal l e f f e c t . Fur thermore , inasmuch as ERB simply 
encourages the unemployed to look more c a r e f u l l y for new jobs then i t can be 
a rgued t h a t t h e r e may be b e n e f i t s t o s o c i e t y in t h e form of a b e t t e r 
matching of s k i l l s wi th j o b s . 
So i t i s ha rd t o a rgue t h a t ERB has had much e f f e c t on t h e i n c e n t i v e t o work 
but only on the i n c e n t i v e to take any old job t h a t comes along. I t i s a l so 
d i f f i c u l t t o look on t h i s as ' s c r o u n g i n g ' p a r t i c u l a r l y when t h e ev idence 
a l so shows t h a t ERB has no s i g n i f i c a n t e f f ec t on longer - te rm unemployment. 
One s tudy su rveyed by Atk inson even found t h a t t h e c o r r e l a t i o n went t h e 
o t h e r way w i t h l o w e r ERB b e i n g a s s o c i a t e d w i t h l o n g e r s p e l l s of 
unemployment. This i s not a s u r p r i s i n g r e s u l t when i t i s apprec ia ted t h a t 
i t i s peop l e w i t h few s k i l l s t o o f f e r t h a t t end to be in l e a s t demand by 
employers. 
' U n e m p l o y a b l e s ' t end t o e x i s t main ly on s u p p l e m e n t a r y b e n e f i t (SB) r a t h e r 
than unemployment b e n e f i t s . Those dependen t on SB can be s p l i t i n t o two 
groups: those who have never had a job , mainly young people , and those who 
have been unemployed fo r a long t i m e . To what e x t e n t has SB reduced t h e 
i n c e n t i v e t o f i n d a j o b ? I f we s e l e c t t h e y e a r s 1966, 1976 and 1978 we 
d i s c o v e r t h a t SB pa id t o t he unemployed as a p e r c e n t a g e of a v e r a g e male 
e a r n i n g s was 63.9%, 61.1? and 56 .4? , r e s p e c t i v e l y . In o t h e r words t h e r e 
has been a s teady d e c l i n e in the a t t r a c t i v e n e s s of l i v i n g on SB r e l a t i v e to 
working. 
The r i s e in numbers depending on SB i s easy to exp la in . Low investment in 
t h e UK has meant t h a t t h e working p o p u l a t i o n has grown f a s t e r than t h e 
number of j o b s . T imbre l l (1980) has es t imated t h a t in the period 1967-78 
t h e working p o p u l a t i o n grew by between 3? and 4? and growth in j o b s was 
roughly zero . As might be expected, the s h o r t f a l l was even tua l ly r e f l e c t e d 
in the numbers dependent on SB, d e s p i t e i t s d e c l i n i n g a t t r a c t i v e n e s s . I t 
i s a l so i n e v i t a b l e t h a t t h i s r e s i d u a l w i l l conta in the l e a s t - q u a l i f i e d and 
u n s k i l l e d who a r e o f f e r e d t h e wors t j ob o p p o r t u n i t i e s , i f they g e t any 
o f fe r s a t a l l . 
So the a v a i l a b l e evidence t e l l s us t h a t very l i t t l e of the observed r i s e in 
u n e m p l o y m e n t can be a t t r i b u t e d t o more a t t r a c t i v e h a n d o u t s t o t h e 
unemployed. Of course , the Conservat ive Government can s t i l l maintain t h a t 
the i n c e n t i v e to work can be r a i sed by c u t t i n g t h i s handout, even though the 
' sc rounger ' view i s i n v a l i d , and t h a t f i rms w i l l be able to h i r e workers a t 
lower wages. -> P o l i t i c a l l y , t h i s i s a popular p o s i t i o n in the sense t h a t 
i t i s s u p p o r t e d by l a r g e l y employed, m i d d l e - c l a s s v o t e r s and i s d i r e c t e d 
towards unemployed, l a r g e l y working c l a s s Labour v o t e r s . 
However, because of the high l e v e l of unemployment, i t has not been poss ib l e 
for the Government to p e n a l i s e the unemployed as much as i t would l i k e and 
i t remains an open ques t ion as to whether t h e i r mot iva t ions are economic or 
p o l i t i c a l . The b e s t way t o answer t h e q u e s t i o n i s t o t u r n t o o t h e r k i n d s 
of s u b s i d i e s t o examine whe the r or not t h e p o s i t i o n i s t h e same. I s i t 
g e n e r a l l y t r u e t h a t t h e Government i s a t t e m p t i n g t o l ower a l l undese rved 
s u b s i d i e s and r a i s e i n c e n t i v e s in every area? 
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If we examine the official statistics on State handouts to persons, we find 
that they fall into two distinct categories. Firstly, there are the direct 
handouts in the form of various types of benefits, supports and pensions. 
The National Insurance Fund, for example, tries to raise revenue from the 
public to pay for these handouts. Secondly, there are the indirect 
benefits in terms of tax reliefs for people in various categories. These 
are paid for in terms of higher taxes levied on everyone else. 
An examination of both categories reveals that the bulk of direct benefits 
not associated with ill-health and old age indeed turn out to be 
unemployment benefits and supplementary benefits to the unemployed. If we 
then turn our attention to the indirect benefits we discover that by far the 
largest component of tax relief not due to individual or family 
characteristics is mortgage interest relief (MIR). 
The Inland Revenue has estimated that in tax year 1979-80, MIR amounted to 
as much as £l,450m. If we compare MIR with unemployment benefits (UEB) 
over the previous four years we discover that MIR has been almost double 
UEB. If we add on SB to UEB we find that the total comes to roughly the 
same as MIR. The Inland Revenue have also estimated that in 1979-80 about 
£2,000m was given in tax relief on capital gains accruing to property 
sellers. Also, the imputed income from property is not taxed in Britain as 
it used to be and still is in other countries. The Inland Revenue offers 
us no estimate but this relief must be very substantial indeed. 
A great deal of time and energy has been devoted to the issue of handouts to 
the unemployed, but what about MIR? Prior to the last General Election, 
the Conservatives did express some concern about the size of MIR, but, in 
power, this concern has not materialised in policy. To what extent, 
therefore, are these handouts deserved and what effect do they have on 
incentives? 
MIR was originally introduced for the best of intentions, namely, to 
facilitate the purchase of owner-occupied housing by first-time buyers. 
However, it is now widely accepted by economists that subsidising demand to 
increase supply is a highly inefficient and expensive policy. It 
encourages house price increases, which makes it harder for first-time 
buyers and the bulk of the relief accrues to people who already own their 
houses. All this amounts to is a transfer of income from people who are not 
owner-occupiers to house-owners. 
It is difficult to think of a social justification for such a large 
transfer. In general, unlike most of the working-class recipients of 
unemployment handouts, which they partly pay for through national insurance 
contributions, most middle-class recipients of MIR do not suffer any serious 
hardship. The room for manoeuvre in cutting unemployment benefits is very 
narrow, whereas MIR could be cut fully without significant hardship. 
The abolition of MIR would be entirely consistent with monetarist policy. 
An extra £l,500m in tax revenue could be employed in two ways in addition to 
a straight reduction in the PSBR. Firstly, the size of government spending 
cuts would be reduced dramatically, given the PSBR and monetary growth 
targets. Although total income in the economy would be unchanged, the 
redistribution of income from middle-class homeowners to working-class non-
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homeowners would stimulate the level of economic activity. This is because 
of the well-known economic fact that lower income earners spend a higher 
proportion of their income than higher income earners. This beneficial 
effect on employment would also slow the upward pressure on the PSBR because 
of rising unemployment benefit payments as a recession worsens. 
The second way the Government could utilise the £1,500 million tax revenue 
would be to lower the standard rate of income tax, keeping tax revenue at 
its old level. The standard rate could be lowered by between 3 to 4 pence 
in the pound in this way. Such a reduction would be in line with the 
Government's desire to increase incentives. What would happen would be 
that both the incentive of home-owners and non-homeowners would be 
increased, despite the fact that the former would have experienced a rise in 
their income taxation. This is because MIR is a tax allowance and has no 
effect on the additional pound earned. Abolition of MIR would cause a 
once-and-for-all jump in income tax but the incentive to earn additional 
pounds would increase because of the lower marginal tax rate. 
Consequently, abolition of MIR would seem an ideal policy change. It 
would work towards all the government's stated objectives and would also 
make the economy fairer by removing some genuine 'scrounging' from the State 
by the undeserving. Why have steps not been taken to implement a change 
which is so complementary with Government policy? Political motives must 
account for this inertia. It would be against the interest of the social 
group which the government represents and might even alienate marginal 
middle-class voters. As soon as we accept this proposition then the idea 
that the Government is interested in operating a monetarist/libertarian 
policy becomes an illusion - political priorities are more important than 
any economic theory. The latter is a convenient excuse for implementing 
policies to redistribute income through recession and for the re-
establishment of a more inegalitarian society. Such a stance is thoroughly 
anti-libertarian and it is curious that monetarist economists should have 
been so willing to help a Government with intentions so contrary to their 
theoretical position. Clearly, it is necessary to explore the manner in 
which economics interacts with politics in more detail. 
4. THE RISE OF MONETARISM 
It is now fashionable to blame economists for the state of the economy. 
The prevailing view is that economic experts work out economic strategies, 
based on theories and evidence, which are then adopted by governments in 
policy formulation. This conventional view is based on the presumption 
that economics is an objective science which, like any other science, 
advances through the discovery of new theories and the establishment of 
laws. This positivist view of economics has enabled economists to become 
forecasters and advisers to business and Government. Furthermore, other 
scientists have tended to accept this view of economics since it is quite 
appealing to suppose that optimisation techniques and statistical analysis 
can be scientifically applied to economic problems. 
There is little doubt that this is true of microeconomics - operations 
research and statistical forecasting are a very useful aid to management but 
what about macroeconomics, which is the kind of economics used to guide 
Government policy? In fact, the whole structure of macroeconomics is 
specifically designed to be complementary to policymaking, focusing on 
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o b s e r v a b l e a g g r e g a t e s which can be c o n t r o l l e d by Government. Keynes' 
Genera l Theory , t h e m a i n s p r i n g of modern macroeconomics was d i r e c t e d 
s p e c i f i c a l l y a t o f f e r i n g a s t r u c t u r e for p o l i c y and d e m o n s t r a t i n g t h e 
var ious t r ansmiss ion mechanisms between ins t ruments and t a r g e t s . On the 
f a c e of i t Keynes o f f e r e d t h e b a s i s fo r a s c i e n c e of Government 
policymaking. 
However, t he Genera l Theory as ' o b j e c t i v e s c i e n c e ' has t h r e e c r i t i c a l 
weaknesses: 
To keep the system manageable, i t focuses on important mechanisms 
and n e g l e c t s mechanisms which a r e u n i m p o r t a n t fo r s h o r t - t e r m 
policymaking. 
2 . The s t a t i s t i c a l evidence used to support the important mechanisms 
i s incomple te , leaving seve ra l v i t a l mechanisms with only 'armchair 
s p e c u l a t i o n s ' t o s u p p o r t them. The d e t e r m i n a t i o n of i n v e s t m e n t 
expendi ture i s the c l e a r e s t example. 
3 . The problem of a g g r e g a t i o n i s i g n o r e d , c a s t i n g doubt on t he 
s c i e n t i f i c re levance of both the t h e o r i e s and evidence offered in 
t h e i r suppor t . 
The idea t h a t the General Theory i s s c i e n t i f i c i s dubious - there i s enough 
evidence in Keynes' o ther w r i t i n g s to suggest t h a t the book was designed to 
offer polemical support to the growing p o l i t i c a l demands in the 1930's for 
government i n t e r v e n t i o n to r a i s e e f f e c t i v e demand and a l l e v i a t e unemployment 
in a s t a g n a t i n g economy. The Genera l Theory was not a s t i m u l u s t o 
government i n t e r v e n t i o n but a r e s p o n s e by Keynes to o f f e r an economic 
framework for i t s a p p l i c a t i o n . The book's s u i t a b i l i t y for t h i s t a s k , both 
through i t s academic q u a l i t y and the p r e s t i g e of Keynes himself , r e s u l t e d in 
i t s p romot ion in t h e p o l i t i c a l a rena as t he main economic gu ide to 
government i n t e r v e n t i o n in a mixed economy. 
Not only does t h i s push the General Theory i n t o t h e c a t e g o r y of p o l i t i c a l 
economy b u t a l s o most of t h e m a c r o e c o n o m i c s t h a t f o l l o w e d . The 
i n c o m p l e t e n e s s of t he General Theory was g r a d u a l l y d i s g u i s e d in "IS-LM" 
r e f i n e m e n t s and a mountain of e c o n o m e t r i c e v i d e n c e . Again , t h e s e 
developments were p o l i t i c a l in o r i g i n . The ideology of the mixed economy 
demanded a t h e o r y which was e x t r e m e l y s i m p l e to u n d e r s t a n d by everyone 
backed up by a v a s t c o m p l e x i t y of t h e o r y and e v i d e n c e , which p rov ided the 
simple theory wi th i n t e l l e c t u a l r e s p e c t a b i l i t y . 
However, because of the u n d e r l y i n g i n c o m p l e t e n e s s , macroeconomics i s a 
s u b j e c t where a lmos t any t h e o r y can be j u s t i f i e d . A whole range of 
t h e o r i e s e x i s t , the c r i t i c a l fac tor i s whether or not a theory i s promoted 
as p a r t of a p o l i t i c a l i d e o l o g y . Thus, when t h e mixed economy ran i n t o 
i n f l a t i o n a r y t r o u b l e s , unexp la ined by the Keynesian o r t h o d o x y , the 
t r a n s i t i o n to M o n e t a r i s t Economics was ach ieved w i t h o u t d i f f i c u l t y . 
Furthermore, t h i s idea t h a t macroeconomics i s u n s c i e n t i f i c in i t s evolu t ion 
rece ives support for i n v e s t i g a t o r s of the evolut ion of sc ience such as Ward 
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(1972) who cou ld no t f i n d key e l e m e n t s in t h e r i s e of Keynes ian i sm which 
c h a r a c t e r i s e o t h e r s c i e n t i f i c r e v o l u t i o n s . ° The manner i n w h i c h 
monetarism has grown in importance d e s p i t e va l id ob jec t ions to i t s t h e o r i e s 
and e v i d e n c e f u r t h e r s u g g e s t s t h a t t h e p r o c e s s has l i t t l e t o do w i t h 
s c i e n t i f i c p r o g r e s s . ' 
Which p o l i t i c a l ideology requ i red monetarism for economic support? I t has 
a l r e a d y been obse rved t h a t t h e r e i s ample e v i d e n c e to s u g g e s t t h a t 
monetarism has been u t i l i s e d as a j u s t i f i c a t i o n by r igh t -wing p o l i t i c i a n s in 
the implementa t ion of r e d i s t r i b u t i v e p o l i c i e s . However, t h a t i s c l e a r l y an 
o v e r s i m p l i f i e d view s ince a s i g n i f i c a n t p ropor t ion of the Conservat ive par ty 
are opposed to the p resen t Government's p o l i c i e s and, a l s o , monetary c o n t r o l 
was f i r s t imp lemen ted by a Labour Government . D i s e n t a n g l e m e n t of t h e s e 
c o m p l e x i t i e s i s a more a p p r o p r i a t e t a s k fo r a p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t than an 
economist . However, i t i s pos s ib l e to offer a rough h i s t o r i c a l sketch of 
e v e n t s . 
Support for monetarism in the l a t e 1960's did not develop from the w r i t i n g s 
of mone ta ry e c o n o m i s t s such as Johnson and L a i d l e r . At t h a t t i m e both 
could be c l a s s i f i e d as ' K e y n e s i a n s who f e l t money was i m p o r t a n t 1 . The 
f i r s t g r o u p t o t a k e up m o n e t a r i s m s e r i o u s l y was s e v e r a l f i n a n c i a l 
i n s t i t u t i o n s and s t o c k - b r o k i n g f i r m s in t h e C i t y . The i r e s p o u s a l of 
monetarism did not a r i s e because of academic i n t e r e s t but because the mixed 
economy s t r a t e g i e s in t h e UK and t h e US had begun t o lower y i e l d s on 
f i n a n c i a l a s s e t s . 
Throughout the 1960's , f i rms had financed t h e i r investment through r e t a ined 
e a r n i n g s r a t h e r t han new i s s u e s , t o a growing e x t e n t . This r e s u l t e d in 
c o n t r o l l e d d i v i d e n d y i e l d s and a l s o fo rced new funds i n t o new i s s u e s of 
Government bonds . However, t h e s e were f i x e d i n t e r e s t and p e r s i s t e n t 
i n f l a t i o n lowered r e a l y i e l d s . In t u r n , these u n a t t r a c t i v e y i e l d s led to 
funds being chane l l ed away from the stock exchange i n to proper ty development 
and s p e c u l a t i o n . The c a l l for m o n e t a r i s t p o l i c i e s in t he Ci ty was a 
r a t i o n a l r e s p o n s e . The i r a d o p t i o n would r e s u l t in an e s c a l a t i o n in 
i n t e r e s t r a t e s and y i e l d s on f i n a n c i a l a s s e t s , a r e v e r s i o n away from 
p r o p e r t y s p e c u l a t i o n o u t s i d e the s t o c k exchange t o f i n a n c i a l a s s e t 
specu la t ion i n s i d e i t and i n h i b i t i o n of the process of Government expansion 
which was a t the roo t of the Ci ty ' s dec l in ing f o r t u n e s . 
However, 'Keynesianism where money was impor tan t ' was hardly s t rong enough 
to back t h e C i t y ' s m o n e t a r i s t campaign . I n s t e a d , t h e deve lopment of 
' r a t i o n a l e x p e c t a t i o n ' m o n e t a r i s m was p r o m o t e d t h r o u g h t h e 1 9 7 0 ' s . 
B a s i c a l l y , the ' e f f i c i e n t market hypo thes i s ' , concerning the funct ioning of 
f i n a n c i a l m a r k e t s , was g e n e r a l i s e d t o macroeconomics , b u i l d i n g on t h e 
i n f l a t i o n a r y e x p e c t a t i o n s t h e o r y of Fr iedman and o t h e r m o n e t a r i s t s . 
U l t i m a t e l y , m o n e t a r i s t t h e o r y was t a i l o r e d t o o f f e r p o w e r f u l , s i m p l e 
s t a t e m e n t s c o n c e r n i n g t h e i n e f f i c a c y of macroeconomic p o l i c y backed up 
highly complex theory and evidence. The i d e o l o g i c a l mix of s i m p l i c i t y and 
complexity observed under Keynesianism was repeated but with much g r e a t e r 
i n t e n s i t y . 
On t h e p o l i t i c a l f r o n t , the spread of mone ta r i sm from the Ci ty was 
i n e v i t a b l e . Success ive Governments, whose answer to most economic problems 
was i n c r e a s e d Government e x p e n d i t u r e , were i n c a p a b l e of imp lemen t ing t h e 
fundamental changes necessary to prevent i n f l a t i o n from developing from the 
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chaotic mixed economy that had evolved. By the early 1970's monetarism had 
spread to the Bank of England, although it still had little foothold in 
Government as the Heath Government gave us the Barber boom. Monetary 
control finally became an effective government policy under the Labour 
Government of the mid-1970's, under severe pressure from the IMF." 
Meanwhile, the dismal failure of the Heath Government opened the way for the 
monetarist faction in the Conservative party. City interests were poised 
to expand the limited monetary control of the Labour Government into a full 
set of recessionary policies under Margaret Thatcher. 
There is little doubt that the use of monetarist analysis to justify policy 
in recent years is a political strategy. There has been little support for 
monetarism amongst the bulk of British economists in recent times.'9 The 
general view of the economists selected by the Government to advise them is 
that they are excessively ambitious, slightly mad or both. In addition, 
the position of many monetary economists has been very ambiguous. Instead 
of protest, we observe such economists either absorbed in the tautologies of 
rational expectations or buried in the technicalities of money definition 
and targets. 
This imbalance between the views of economists as a group and the small 
number who advise the Government, directly or indirectly, further supports 
the hypothesis that Governments simply use economic theories for political 
ends. Financial inducements in the form of consultation fees, research 
grants and positions as economic advisers are all offered as inducements to 
economists to accept and work within a particular set of economic premises. 
This form of bribery is not restricted to economists working directly for 
the Government but also applies to economists who would not regard 
themselves as monetarists, but are prepared to 'play the game' and conduct a 
dialogue with pro-monetarist factions. For example, the National Institute 
will debate with the London Business School about technicalities such as the 
relative size of estimated elasticities in econometric models. There is an 
unwillingness to admit that a model is invalid in its assumptions, non-
scientific in its empirical estimation and political in its intention. In 
London, monetarism depends as much on its opponents taking it seriously as 
it does on its proponents. Meanwhile, economists who dismiss the whole 
pseudo-scientific approach have little influence on policy but can only 
stand back and watch those, who have compromised on their academic 
standards, inflict significant damage on the economics profession. 
In summary, it appears to be the case that the roots of current economic 
policy lie in the political motivations. It follows that a broad range of 
economic expertise cannot be influential on policy-making without 
fundamental political change. Furthermore, economists need to acknowledge 
the links between politics and economics, all too frequently assumed away, 
if they are to identify instances where their discipline is being exploited 
for political gain. 
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper it has been argued that the macroeconomic policies of the 
present Government cannot be regarded as a test of monetarism. They are 
based on the political interests of the City and are an attempt to 
strengthen the position of financial capital relative to other income and 
wealth categories in the economy. Furthermore, the macroeconomics which is 
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used t o defend t h e s e p o l i c i e s i s u n s c i e n t i f i c and u n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of 
c u r r e n t economic t h i n k i n g . The minor i ty of economists who provide support 
for t h e s e p o l i c i e s a r e e i t h e r p o l i t i c a l s u p p o r t e r s of t h e Government or 
mercenar ies prepared to s e l l t h e i r t e c h n i c a l s k i l l for f i n a n c i a l ga in . 
Many economists have a l ready p ro t e s t ed openly a t the Government's p o l i c i e s 
w i t h l i t t l e e f f e c t g iven t h a t t h e s e p o l i c i e s a r e d e t e r m i n e d p o l i t i c a l l y . 
Much more of t h e i r a t t e n t i o n should be d i r e c t e d a t a t t a c k i n g the economists 
who provide c r e d i b i l i t y for such p o l i c i e s , not through academic debat ing but 
t h rough a d i r e c t p e r s o n a l c h a l l e n g e of academic i n t e g r i t y . For example , 
should e c o n o m i s t s be a l l o w e d t o earn s u b s t a n t i a l f e e s from p o l i t i c a l 
c o n s u l t a n c y w h i l e a l s o h o l d i n g a U n i v e r s i t y p o s t ? Should c l e a r l i n e s be 
drawn between academic r e sea rch and advis ing? 
There has a l w a y s been a v a l i d demand by t a x p a y e r s t h a t academics shou ld 
address themselves to p r a c t i c a l l y r e l e v a n t ques t ions and to pursue resea rch 
t h a t provides knowledge which i s as c lose to the t r u t h as p o s s i b l e . Thus, 
the tendency of academic economists to become a d v i s e r s has been welcomed. 
However, i t i s a l so t r u e t h a t f i n a n c i a l inducements to advise lead to moral 
hazards and r e q u i r e the a p p l i c a t i o n of much s t ronger s t andards of conduct. 
Q u e s t i o n i n g of t he m o t i v a t i o n s of e c o n o m i s t s who p r o v i d e i n t e l l e c t u a l 
support for p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s i s an impor tant but secondary ques t ion . The 
primary ques t ion remains a p o l i t i c a l one; why i s i t the case t h a t minor i ty 
i n t e r e s t g roups a r e a l l o w e d t o t a l c o n t r o l once t h e i r p o l i t i c a l p a r t y has 
been e l e c t e d t o Government? This r a i s e s q u e s t i o n s about t he e x t e n t of 
democracy w i t h i n t h e s e p a r t i e s and in t h e n a t i o n as a whole . Marga re t 
Thatcher d i s m i s s e s democrat ic consensus as the rou te to weak government, a 
s e n t i m e n t s h a r e d b y many l e f t - w i n g members of t h e Labour p a r t y . 
J u s t i f i c a t i o n for such a view i s t h a t democracy has f a i l e d in the past - but 
has democracy been adequate ly t e s t e d ? 
In f ac t democracy i s so l i m i t e d as to bare ly e x i s t and has become r e l a t i v e l y 
more l i m i t e d as t i m e has p a s s e d . Democracy c o n s i s t s of p l a c i n g a c r o s s 
a g a i n s t a b a r e l y known p o l i t i c a l c a n d i d a t e who b e l o n g s t o a p a r t y w i th a 
complex range of p o l i c i e s which are imprec ise and r a r e l y adhered t o . This 
happens a t l e a s t eve ry f i v e y e a r s . Democracy has become more l i m i t e d 
because the d e c i s i o n s voted on have become more and more ex tens ive as time 
has passed. Our p resen t vot ing system was much c lose r to democracy in the 
days of l a i s s e z - f a i r e , when government i n t e r v e n t i o n was minimal, than i t i s 
today. So democracy remains un tes ted except in the i n d i r e c t sense t h a t we 
know what c o m p l e t e l a c k of democracy was l i k e in H i t l e r ' s Germany and i s 
l i k e in the Sovie t Union. We a lso have some evidence from comparisons of 
r e l a t i v e degrees of democracy across c o u n t r i e s . For example, the success 
of ex t e rna l impos i t ion of democracy in West Germany a f t e r the Second World 
War and the success of ex tens ive democracy in c o u n t r i e s l i k e Swi tze r land . 
The r i s e of the SDP o f f e r s the prospect t h a t democracy might be extended in 
v a r i o u s ways. D e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n , t h e h a r n e s s i n g of new t e c h n o l o g y to 
f a c i l i t a t e rapid c o n s u l t a t i o n and the a l t e r a t i o n of vot ing methods a l l offer 
the prospect of a per iod where increased democracy could be put to the t e s t . 
However, i t remains to be seen whether we are wi tness ing another l i p - s e r v i c e 
e x e r c i s e d e s i g n e d to d i s g u i s e t h e p u r s u i t of t he p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t s of a 
p a r t i c u l a r group, Perhaps the SDP l e a d e r s h i p s t r u g g l e a l ready confirms Tony 
Benn's s cep t i c i sm t h a t 'democracy' i s merely window-dressing. 
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Hopefully, this is not the case for lack of democracy tends to develop a 
vicious circularity so well observed by Hannah Arendt in Germany during the 
1920s. Lack of democracy and the domination of political conflict in 
Government leads to the belief that elected Government is contradictory and 
weak. This produces a growing alienated group who seek a strong 
alternative to bankrupt consensus. The idea that co-operation can lead to 
mutual benefit is replaced by a belief that gains can only be made by 
dispossession of another group. The 'mob' will eagerly support any strong 
group of political extremists who promise them benefits as members. In the 
words of Hannah Arendt 
"Practically speaking, it will make little difference 
whether totalitarian movements adopt the pattern of 
Nazism or Bolshevism, organise the masses in the name of 
race or class, pretend to follow the laws of life and 
nature or of dialectics and economics". 
Such a warning seems particularly appropriate at the present time when we 
look back on a visible strengthening of support for political extremism. 
It is easy for 'moderate' politicians to attack such extremism but are they 
also willing to attack their own past political history? It is nonsense to 
suggest that the present economic position of the UK is due entirely to the 
present Government's policies. The current economic position is a product 
of a succession of Governments with different ideologies but similar 
political and economic packages. These Governments were unable to cope 
with various structural changes in the economy and are unlikely to do so in 
the future in the absence of fundamental democratic reform. Such a failure 
would further strengthen the support from political extremism, just as it 
has done in the past. 
Footnotes 
1. It is well established that at the beginning of a cyclical upturn there 
will be an increase in bank lending to finance liquidity. This is not 
evidence of inflation but the beginnings of economic growth. 
2. See Friedman (1980) for a typical statement. 
3. See The Economist vol 281, No 7205, ppl3-15 October, 1981. 
4. See Minford and Peel (1981) for a recent example of this view. 
5. It is very difficult to test this hypothesis using conventional 
econometric techniques since we are dealing with a qualitative rather 
than a quantitative phenomenon. However, there is evidence to suggest 
that 'stop-go' policy has had adverse effects on investment. Also the 
Wilson Committee (1980) argued that such factors may be of some 
importance. 
6. The most graphic example of these dynamics at work is provided by 
Germany in the 1920s when policy contradictions by political coalitions 
finally gave way to open conflict between Communists and Nazis, as 
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economic decline proceeded. See Arendt (1973) for an extended 
discussion of this period. 
7. For a more extended discussion of monetarist/libertarian thought and 
policy recommendations, see Hayek (1976) and Brennan and Buchanan 
(1980). 
8. See Buiter (1980) and Casson (198l) for discussion of this issue. 
9. Kaldor and Trevithick (1981) concluded that monetarism was founded in 
'metaphysics' rather than in any analysis of the real world. 
10. See Friedman and Meiselman (1963) for a statement of this position in 
their attack on Keynesian reduced-form studies of the determination of 
National Income. 
11. See Friedman (1980). 
12. See Laidler (1981) for discussion of this political damange. 
13. See Laidler (1981). 
14. Much more a t t e n t i o n has been paid to s t u d i e s such as t h a t conducted by 
Benjamin and Kochin (1979) which produced evidence t ha t unemployment in 
the Great Depression was voluntary and a response to high unemployment 
b e n e f i t s . Like the bulk of e m p i r i c a l e v i d e n c e produced by neo -
c l a s s i c a l m o n e t a r i s t s i t has proved to be m i s l e a d i n g - Hat ton (1980) 
shows t h a t t h e i r r e s u l t s a r e a p r o d u c t of a s t a t i s t i c a l d e t r e n d i n g 
e r r o r . 
15. Th i s k ind of ' b u l l d o z e r app roach ' to s o l v i n g complex p rob lems has 
c h a r a c t e r i s e d much of cu r r en t Government po l i cy . The 'Keynes e f f e c t ' 
whereby r e s u l t a n t income cuts lower aggregate demand and labour demand 
are ignored or d ismissed as a t r a n s i t i o n a l problem. 
16. Ward a p p l i e d t h e methods used by Kuhn (1970) t o i n v e s t i g a t e the 
s t r u c t u r e of s c i e n t i f i c r e v o l u t i o n s . 
17 . Theo re t i c a l and emp i r i ca l ob jec t ions to mone ta r i s t a n a l y s i s of the r e a l 
world have grown in volume d u r i n g t h e 1970s . Again see Casson (1981) 
and Bui te r (1980) plus Akerloff (198O) and Hahn (1980). However, these 
are only a few examples r e p r e s e n t i n g a broad l i t e r a t u r e which has done 
l i t t l e to h a l t t h e p r o g r e s s of mone ta r i sm as a p o l i t i c a l l y i m p o r t a n t 
t heo ry . 
18 . A d m i t t e d l y , the Labour Government did not adhe re to the methods l a i d 
down in " C o m p e t i t i o n and C r e d i t C o n t r o l " but p r e f e r r e d t o o p e r a t e 
l i a b i l i t y c e i l i n g s . Such i n t e r f e r e n c e with the market was unpopular in 
t h e Ci ty g iven t h a t i t i n t e r f e r e d w i t h ' f r e e marke t ' f o r c e s in t he 
de te rmina t ion of i n t e r e s t r a t e s . 
19. Lack of support was r e f l e c t e d in the unprecedented 'group of 364 l e t t e r ' 
to the Government. 
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